原标题：
The Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: conditional collaboration?
中文摘要：《亚开行和亚投行：有条件的合作？》，卡耐基国际和平基金会研究员Robert M. Orr5月4日发布。文章认为，管理方面的限制性条件是亚洲开发银行（ADB)和亚洲基础设施投资银行(AIIB)合作的最初驱动力，双方机构在亚投行的管理模式如何能够提供足够保障（保障对于亚开行及世界银行都至关重要）方面达成比较好的共识。多边开发银行之间协同合作尤为重要。但由于政策偏好的不同，有时达不到协同的目标。例如，亚洲开发银行可能在环境方面可能比亚投行有更加严格的标准。作者指出，亚开行和亚投行之间健康的竞争不但不是坏事，而且还能够促进各自机构的改革。亚投行的存在将推动亚开行扩大并深化改革，同时还能够提高保障体系以及项目本身的效力。这终将会受益于每个人。
原文：
Creation of the Chinese-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has won considerable attention in many capitals, particularly in Washington and Tokyo. Some view the establishment of the AIIB as a challenge to the supremacy of the post-World War II Bretton Woods order. Others see it as a symbol of shifting regional power in Asia. Some have deep concerns about the AIIB’s willingness to adhere to international safeguards and open procurement.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB)
Washington and Tokyo were less than thrilled with the creation of the AIIB to say the least. Ironically, this is not the first time the US questioned the establishment of a Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) in Asia. While the ADB has come to be regarded by many as a Japanese-American bank, there were voices in Washington that opposed the ADB prior to its creation in 1966. Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon and others in the State Department feared that a new regional MDB would act as a financial resource lamprey to a more established institution like the World Bank.
The crunch time came at the 1965 meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in Wellington. The US delegation had been instructed not to pledge any capital for an Asian regional bank. However, at the last minute, word came from the Johnson White House that the president was not necessarily opposed. This allayed the concerns of policymakers who believed that White House support greatly improved the possibility of persuading Congress to approve the ADB. With the president’s green light, the US proceeded to become a capital contributor to the ADB. Now, years later, there is a discussion about whether the United States might join the AIIB and, once again, one of the concerns is whether the Hill will acquiesce.
Today, the ADB is the largest of all regional banks. Next year, its equity will triple to around $53 billion from $18 billion with the merger of the hard loan window, known as ordinary capital resources, and the soft loan Asian Development Fund. The latter will become a 100 percent grant operation, a reform so significant that other MDBs are considering it as a future model.
The two largest shareholders of the ADB are the US and Japan with roughly 15.7 percent each, followed by China at 6.5 percent, and India at six percent. Roughly 70 percent of the development portfolio is focused on five countries, including China. It has not been easy for Capitol Hill to reconcile the fact that China is a main ADB borrower, given that China is the second largest economy in the world with a growing rival development bank and a manned space program.
Governance structure of the ADB
The Manila-based ADB has 67 member countries stretching from the Pacific Islands to Western Europe. Its 24-member Board of Directors (BoD) reports to the Board of Governors. The US governor is the Secretary of the Treasury. The BoD oversees the strategic direction of the Bank and approves the budget, policies, and all projects. During my five-plus years as ambassador at the ADB, I recall many discussions with regional bilateral US ambassadors to see whether we could get the ADB to support various projects or make sure we supported certain projects at the Board level in the countries where they represented US interests.
The Board is based at ADB Headquarters in Manila and has the feel of a legislature. Serving on the Board often reminded me of my days as a Congressional staffer back in the 1970s. This sense was even stronger after I became Dean of the Board, the first American in the history of the ADB.
The “administration” of the Bank also feels a little like the US government. The president, who has always been a Japanese national from Japan’s Ministry of Finance, is the ADB’s “POTUS.” The six vice presidents, who are regionally determined and always include a US citizen, are similar to Cabinet officers. Below them are directors general who are akin to assistant secretaries and from there the bureaucracy descends in a structure not unlike that of Washington, all answerable to the country stakeholders on the BoD. The Bank has its equivalent of “hearings” where policies or projects can be questioned and tweaked by Board members. By the time something goes to a formal Board meeting chaired by the ADB president, a little tweaking can still occur but the passage of the project or policy is assured.
Three countries on the Board represent only one capital: Japan has one executive director (ED), as does China and the US. Since 1966, the US ED is an ambassador and usually the only one on the BoD to hold that rank. The other ADB country stakeholders represent constituencies of between five and 10 countries from the developed and developing world.
Over the years, US priorities at the ADB have focused on promoting accountability, improving transparency, and ensuring that ADB resources are used effectively and efficiently, as well as encouraging support for countries important to US interests. These are goals that to various degrees are usually consistent with other member countries.